

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
6 June 1960
and
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
7 June 1960

I. Essential issues facing us are:

To analyze as best we can the policy of the USSR and Communist China over the immediate future in the light of recent developments, and prepare measures to meet it.

It is obvious that if our problems with the Communist Bloc could be resolved peacefully, other issues from Cuba to Laos, from Berlin to Black Africa would become manageable.

But with Soviet, Communist China and their satellites competing with the Free World for every inch of the uncommitted world, the struggle will continue to be an intensive one; although it may well remain "peaceful" - in the sense of short of nuclear war.

Must recognize, however, whatever the tactics, long term objective of International Communism is to bury us.

They openly preach that Communism is the wave of the future - that just as our present capitalistic free enterprise society succeeded feudalism, so Communism will swallow up capitalism.

Khrushchev suggests this can be for us a peaceful and painless development.

No secret that the Communists in Moscow and Peiping propose to help along in every way possible to them what they conceive to be this wave of the future.

II. If this is so, and I fundamentally believe it to be, why should K have started out on his program of co-existence and a relaxation of tensions?

Primarily he felt he needed to buy time for these purposes:

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(1) First, to realize his seven year plan and to develop his economic and industrial base to a point where successful competition for world domination became feasible both in time of peace and where, in event of war, he could emerge successful.

(2) Second, to complete his missile program and to provide adequate protection to his homeland, both against our bombers and maybe also against missiles.

(The anti-missile missile.)

(3) Third, to secure, during this period of relaxation, working bases political and economic in the uncommitted world, particularly in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Black Africa and Latin America. (Mention Iraq - Laos - Indonesia - Guinea - Cuba.)

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(4) Fourth, to drive a wedge in NATO and other Free World alliances by creating the impression that it was no longer necessary to ally against Communism and that U. S. was leading alliances toward nuclear war.

(5) Fifth, to get the United States out of Europe and out of overseas bases; this to be accomplished through realizing objectives mentioned in last point.

(6) Sixth, to soften us up, to slacken our military preparedness, by selling us "sweetness and light".

(7) Seventh, hopefully to get trade going between the Communist World and the Free World so that they could press on their industrial development more effectively by obtaining prototypes, machinery, plane and equipment from the West.

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There well may be other reasons, but these constitute quite a program.

III. Communist China never believed in this policy of Co-existence.

While it desired some of the same objectives as Khrushchev desired to get by his co-existence program, they differed fundamentally both as to the extent of the danger of this program to Communist society and to its ultimate effectiveness.

(Discuss Sino-Soviet problem.)

IV. Khrushchev probably understood that this program inherently involved risks to his form of Government, to Communism itself, Still he felt that these could be kept within manageable proportions.

What were these risks?

a. Opening up to the Soviet contact with the outside world both human contacts and contacts to all forms of news media and the like.

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b. This in turn permitted the Soviet people to realize what free societies had accomplished, what they meant in terms of liberty and opportunity for the individual.

c. This also carried the implication to the Soviet peoples that a compromise was possible between capitalism and Communism, between freedom and slavery. It implied that our free societies were not all bad, that our leaders were people with whom he could deal.

d. All this, coupled with the massive progress in education in the Soviet Union especially over the past decade, tended to show the Soviet people that there was an alternative, and a workable alternative, to Communism, tended to make them question basic tenets of Communist philosophy, to make some of them chafe at a closed society.

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When Wendell Wilkie visited the Soviet Union during the war and studied the Soviet educational system, he suggested to Stalin that he was likely to educate himself out of a job. Stalin laughed. Khrushchev has been pondering.

V. This was background of situation as Khrushchev prepared for the Summit and the President's visit to the Soviet Union.

If he could have wrung concessions out of the Summit on Berlin and disarmament -- or if without that he could have broken the unity of the Western Powers, the Summit and the President's visit with all its disadvantages might have been a plus. If, however, he failed in this and yet the Conference and the visit proceeded, the plus might have been turned into a minus.

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VI. It seems clear that during the weeks preceeding Summit Conference, issues such as above were vigorously debated in the Kremlin. Pro and cons of "co-existence".

Meanwhile the evidence was accumulating that K at Summit would have little chance of breaking up the Western solidarity over Berlin or in a major way over disarmament.

(Refer speeches Herter, Dillon)

His own pre-Summit speeches, particularly at Baku reverted to the tough line possibly evidencing that the tough group in the Kremlin was having its influence on him, or that he had more and more to follow their lead.

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VII. Into this situation came the U-2 incident. From May 1 to May 5, four full days during which K said nothing, there must have been a debate as to whether to remain quiet about the incident, to shove it under the rug as it were, or to build it up. To advertise the flight risked baring to Soviet people our ability to overfly.

First statement on May 5 showed decision to publicize incident -- but still no clew as to how far they would go. Second statement-- May 7--indicated decision to make an incident out of U-2. At this point Mikoyan went off on vacation.

The result of May 7 statement in turn forced hand in Washington - with the official acknowledgment of high authority for the flights.

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VIII. My presentation on this subject.

IX. The influence of the flight on the Summit.

Undoubtedly the excuse questionable whether the basic cause.

Have already indicated that K had opportunities to take
other course -- Between May 1 - 5 before first disclosure made.
Then again in Paris - after President stated flights stopped and
would not be resumed.

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